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ABSTRACT 
 
In the summer of 2005, the Society of Energy Professionals Hydro One 
Local engaged in unprecedented strike action that lasted 105 days. This article 
documents the strike, and explores how and why it occurred, and with such 
significant support and participation from the 1000 members of a union that had 
no militant history. I trace the build-up, progression and resolution of the strike, 
drawing from Society materials, media reports and ethnographic observation, as 
well as the insights of elected leaders, staff representatives, and rank and file 
members of the Society collected through interviews and written questionnaires. 
I conclude that government policy and management behaviour caused worker 
anger but that union education, organization and democracy were integral to 
moving these “professional” workers into job action.  
 
 
 
 
n the sweltering heat of the summer of 2005, hundreds of workers 
could be seen protesting at the Ontario legislature, appearing in 
television commercials, and picketing workplaces, fundraising 
dinners and golf tournaments across the province. These strategies are not un-
common for striking workers, but this particular group was the Hydro One Local 
of the Society of Energy Professionals, a 1000 member local with no history of 
strikes, militancy or union consciousness.    
The purpose of this article is to document the strike and present 
reflections on how and why it occurred. To do so, I first outline the history and 
composition of what is now the Society of Energy Professionals, or “the Society,” 
and present an overview of the recent restructuring of Ontario’s energy sector to 
situate the union and strike historically. Then I highlight key events in the build-
up to the strike, and trace its 105-day progression and resolution. I conclude by 
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synthesizing the key factors that caused these workers to participate and support 
unprecedented, union-based job action. Strategies for engaging and politicizing 
already represented but inactive professional-managerial workers are important 
for broad-based union renewal.  
Much of the literature on professional worker militancy in Canada is now 
dated.  There is some research on the job actions of nurses and teachers, on 
white-collar strikes and on the political action of professional-managerial 
workers (see, for example, Armstrong 1993, Briskin 2006, Coulter 1993, Glasbeek 
1999, Jennings 1993, Kuehn 2006, McKercher and Mosco eds. 2007, Mironi 2008). 
Puaca (2008) considers the role of the Society of Women Engineers during the 
Cold War, but we know little about professional engineers and their workplace 
militancy, particularly in Canada.  
To explore the Hydro One strike of energy professionals, the majority of 
whom are engineers, I enlist materials produced by the Society, media reports of 
the strike and the insights of elected leaders and union organizers collected 
through semi-structured interviews. I also incorporate the views of rank and file 
members of the Hydro One Local who were invited to share their thoughts in a 
voluntary e-mail questionnaire.  I was completing ethnographic fieldwork on 
political workers and the production of neoliberal government inside the Ontario 
legislature when I first learned of and witnessed the Society’s job action, so I also 
draw data from directly observing the strike.  
By examining the data, it becomes clear that union education, local 
organization and direct, democratic worker engagement were integral to the 
collective decision to resist and strike. Both the mobilization process itself and 
the specific emphases used to engage the majority of workers, foster collective 
consciousness and inspire action were significant. Government energy policy 
and the management of Hydro One, Ontario’s “largest electricity delivery 
company,” in particular, were problematic for the energy professionals, but it 
was the comprehensive, participatory strategies pursued within the local to 
inform and involve members that fostered a widespread commitment to 
collectively resist through job action. 
 
AN OLD ASSOCIATION, A NEW UNION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
SOCIETY OF ENERGY PROFESSIONALS 
 
  The organization now known as the Society of Energy Professionals 
developed distinctly from the Power Workers Union (PWU) and Canadian 
Union of Public Employees (CUPE) hydro locals. Within the male-dominated 
hydro industry, workers split into “professional” and “blue-collar” groups based 
on work performed; employees’ perceptions of their roles, class, status and 
labour; and labour legislation. Many of the white-collar hydro workers were 
professional engineers, and thus identified as both members of a larger 
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engineering profession, and as part of Ontario Hydro. The roots of the Society 
are in a bargaining unit formed in 1944 that consisted entirely of professional 
engineers at Ontario Hydro.  However, in 1944, Professional Engineers Ontario 
(PEO), a licensing and regulating body for engineering, surveyed its members to 
determine whether they would like to be represented by a trade union, employee 
association or professional engineers group. An overwhelming majority voted in 
favour of a professional engineers group and the Federation of Employee-
Professional Engineers and Assistants was formed (Professional Engineers 
Ontario 1997).  The professional engineers’ group lobbied actively against 
compulsory collective bargaining for engineers, and in 1948, in an emerging Cold 
War culture within which labour gains were threatened across North America, 
the Ontario government revoked collective bargaining rights for engineers.   
In the 1950s, a voluntary representative bargaining association for 
engineers was formed.  In 1961, a “Master Agreement” with Ontario Hydro was 
established, outside of the Ontario Labour Relations Act (OLRA). The agreement 
recognized the Society as the exclusive bargaining agent for various salary 
schedules and included provision for a grievance-arbitration procedure and 
arbitration for salary negotiations only. Ontario Hydro unilaterally terminated 
the Master Agreement in 1983. During this time the organization was first known 
as the Society of Ontario Hydro Professional Engineers and then became the 
Society of Ontario Hydro Professionals and Administration Employees when the 
unit was expanded beyond engineers to include many “professional” employees 
in the 1970s.  Society representatives remember this latter move as contentious, 
particularly for some engineers who wished to be represented completely 
separately, even from other white-collar workers within Ontario Hydro.  
A new Master Agreement was signed in 1983. It expanded the unit to 
include some trades and additional office workers, a move that was again 
resisted by some professional engineers who saw it as a “dilution” of the 
organization as a body of professionals. The Society then applied for certification 
under the OLRA in 1986 but the process was delayed, particularly because of the 
employer’s contention that about 3000 of the Society’s 7000 members were 
managers and thus ineligible for coverage under the OLRA. During the term the 
New Democratic Party government was formed in 1990 and following the 
appointment of a new President and CEO of Ontario Hydro, Marc Eliesen, 
voluntary recognition negotiations began.  Society staff representative James Bell 
reports that a voluntary recognition agreement was reached in November 1991, 
ratified by about 90% of the proposed bargaining unit, and took effect on January 
14, 1992.  This agreement established mediation-arbitration for all collective 
bargaining disputes.  Under this agreement, neither party could terminate the 
use of mediation-arbitration until the expiry of the collective agreement in effect 
on January 1, 2001. 
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         Negotiations with Ontario Hydro in 1998 were linked to the Conservative 
government’s energy restructuring, crucial sectoral changes I expand upon in the 
next section.  These negotiations led to a mediated, two-year term settlement 
establishing the terms of transition from Ontario Hydro to successor companies, 
and the terms of the initial collective agreements between the Society and these 
successor companies. This settlement extended the use of mediation-arbitration 
to resolve collective bargaining disputes until the expiry of the collective 
agreement in effect on January 1, 2005. 
Subsequent negotiations with the new Hydro One resulted in arbitrated 
collective agreements for January 1, 2001 – December 31, 2001, January 1, 2002 - 
December 31, 2002, and finally January 1, 2003 - March 31, 2005. According to 
Society representatives, during negotiations for the 2003-2005 agreement in the 
fall of 2002, Hydro One made it clear that it wished to terminate the use of 
mediation-arbitration.  Immediately after the new agreement came into effect on 
January 1, 2003, Hydro One served the Society with written notice of the 
termination of mediation-arbitration. This set the stage for the strike that would 
occur in 2005. 
The Society now represents 7000 workers and has collective agreements 
at Hydro One, Bruce Power, Inergi, Kinectrics, Nuclear Safety Solutions, Ontario 
Power Generation, Toronto Hydro, Vertex Customer Management, Brookfield 
Power Trust, Electrical Safety Authority, Independent Electricity System 
Operator and New Horizon System Solutions.  The membership of the Society is 
largely composed of engineers but also includes scientists, finance specialists, 
administrators, information technology personnel and supervisors. Members are 
either hired with university degrees, or are members of the PWU who climb the 
ranks and are promoted into supervisory positions. The Society estimates that 
the numbers are about even for each group. Society members work in close-
proximity with many members of CUPE and the PWU.  According to the Society, 
the CUPE and PWU members are more “hands-on,” while the Society members 
are more often in supervisory and planning capacities, seen as performing more 
professional, intellectual labour. Members of the “professional” and “working 
class” or “blue-collar” unions are both cordial and mocking of each other, 
depending on the personalities, place of work, situation and timing. Members of 
the Society recalled that their unit had crossed a PWU picket in the 1970s, and 
were very aware that the members of the PWU remembered this act as well.  
Society representatives and members identify the PWU as the union 
preferred by successive governments and employer representatives, and believe 
it receives superior treatment in many arenas.  It is important to note, then, that 
both division and collaboration mark the relationship among the different unions 
in Ontario’s hydro system.  
It is also important to recognize that the Society was primarily a servicing 
union during much the 1990s. Since the union had mediation-arbitration as its 
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dispute resolution framework, and had never considered a strike, no strike-
related policies or structures existed. Participation in union meetings was low. 
Given its history, it is not surprising that the Society did not seek to be and was 
not seen as an explicitly political body or a proactive trade union. Some members 
felt that engineers did not need unions or that the Society was not a real union. 
Members said that prior to the strike they saw the Society as “weak,” “un-
observed,” “not noticeable,” “a faceless presence in the background looking after 
our interests.” They understood themselves to be “professionals” and there was 
a widespread recognition of the need for voluntary overtime as part of their 
commitment.  Members were hesitant to file grievances because they self-
identified as dutiful professionals and were interested in individual career 
advancement and thus avoided conflicts. 
However, both the agenda of the union and the involvement and 
perceptions of rank and file Society members began to change in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s in response to the restructuring of the energy sector. This 
political economic context laid the foundation for subsequent union action.  
 
ENERGY RESTRUCTURING IN ONTARIO: FACES OF NEOLIBERALISM 
 
 The Conservative government of Mike Harris and later Ernie Eves 
favoured deregulation and privatization of public assets and services as part of 
its allegiance to an agenda known as neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is a project of 
“marketization” and involves politics, economics and culture.  It is about 
applying the policies and values of the corporate boardroom to all facets of life. 
Competition and individualism are pursued as ideas and as tangible agendas.  
Public services and assets are identified as commodities that can be privatized, 
delivered by for-profit companies and deregulated. Neoliberalism has been 
pursued in different forms in many countries since the 1970s in Chile under the 
Pinochet dictatorship, including in Canada under Mulroney, Chrétien, Martin 
and Harper.  
Under the neoliberal rubric, large hydro systems have been privatized 
and electricity markets deregulated around the world. Conservatives regarded 
Ontario Hydro as a public asset that could be broken apart and sold to energy 
capitalists. In 1999, the Ontario Competition Act took effect, breaking Ontario 
Hydro into Ontario Power Generation (OPG), Ontario Hydro Services Company 
(OHSC – now Hydro One Inc.), the Independent Market Operator (IMO – now 
the Independent Electricity System Operator) and the Electrical Safety Authority 
(ESA). The ultimate goal was the privatization of Ontario’s hydro generation 
(OPG) and transmission grid (Hydro One) and the deregulation of the electricity 
market so for-profit providers could charge self-determined prices for power.   
The following few years were tumultuous as people fought the neoliberal 
restructuring agenda. Power costs increased for Ontario citizens and prompted 
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anger, as did increasing concerns about the reliability of for-profit power. Trade 
unions, the NDP, citizens’ and environmental groups and the newly formed 
Ontario Electricity Coalition resisted the privatization politically. CUPE and the 
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers’ Union (CEP) sued the Ontario 
government to stop the privatization with partial success. In 2002, the provincial 
government cancelled plans to fully privatize Hydro One after a judge ruled that 
the government lacked the authority to do so. The Conservative government was 
forced to announce that it would remain a majority shareholder, although Hydro 
One is no longer a crown corporation, but rather a shared ownership, corporate 
holding company run as a commercial entity (Hydro One 2008).  
Hydro One CEO Eleanor Clitheroe was fired in 2002 and replaced by 
Tom Parkinson in April 2003. He was the CEO throughout the 2005 strike. 
Parkinson had been the CEO of private energy companies in the United States 
and Australia. Hydro One boasts that it is the largest electricity provider in 
Ontario, accounting for 96% of transmission and holding $12.79 billion in total 
assets (Hydro One 2008). 
Neither the Society nor the PWU joined the Ontario Electricity Coalition, 
a broad-based network consisting of social justice groups, the NDP, and, 
primarily, trade unions united in opposition to privatization and deregulation, 
and in favour of “truly accountable, publicly owned, environmentally 
responsible electrical utilities” (Ontario Electricity Coalition 2003). In fact, the 
PWU did not resist privatization, despite CUPE’s leadership role in opposing 
energy restructuring, and the PWU local president became a vice-president at 
Ontario Power Generation (Swift and Stewart 2005).  In 2003, both the PWU and 
the Society negotiated equity stakes in the newly privatized Bruce Power, a 
major energy generator in Ontario, with the PWU holding 4%and the Society 
1.2% (Ontario Electricity Coalition 2003).   
At the same time, the Society’s members support public power because 
they have evaluated the international data, and have determined that public 
power is the most reliable, safe and inexpensive.  Society representatives insist 
that they were opposed to the privatization agenda from the outset but upon 
seeing sector restructuring as inevitable, sought to focus on minimizing the 
damage to their members.   
When the Liberal Party of Ontario formed government in 2003 and 
introduced Bill 100, the Ontario Electricity Restructuring Act, the Society began 
lobbying for amendments in a proactive campaign. On October 13, 2004, the 
Society held a lobby day at the Ontario legislature during which more than forty 
members stressed the need to have energy in public hands and to halt plans to 
contract generation out to private companies. The Society’s media release quoted 
its president, Andrew Müller:  "The government's plan to contract for expensive 
and unreliable sources of power will increase consumer electricity rates 
dramatically and force electricity-reliant industries to move production out of 
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Ontario…Bill 100 will significantly undermine Ontario's publicly owned and 
operated power system and create a new one based on a model that has failed in 
many other jurisdictions" (Society of Energy Professionals, 2004). The Society 
also issued an open letter to the Premier in a national paper and launched 
television ads denouncing Bill 100.  
These efforts demonstrated an increasing politicization of the Society’s 
actions and occurred as the members of the Society were engaging in discussions 
about their own contract, its relationship to government energy policy, and the 
future of their workforce. 
 
THE 2005 STRIKE 
 
 When the elected-leadership of the Society assessed the history and the 
present state of the energy sector and Hydro One, they knew that 2005 
negotiations would be more difficult than previous rounds. Hydro One was 
unique among the successor companies because its management had failed to 
reach a two-party settlement with the Society since the company’s creation in 
1999. Hydro One had, however, reached a series of two-party settlements 
without concessions in negotiations with the PWU.  Human resources and labour 
relations consultants had been hired by Hydro One and had remained in place 
when Clitheroe was fired and Parkinson hired as CEO. The employer had also 
terminated mediation-arbitration resolution mechanisms in 2003. Society 
representatives reflected upon this history and identified an increasingly clear 
targeting of the Society by Hydro One CEOs as a union that could be weakened, 
decertified, or taken-over by the PWU.  
   Elected leaders like local vice-president Keith Rattai and Society staff 
representatives felt that in this context and given the lack of political militancy 
exhibited by the Society historically, detrimental concessions would be proposed 
by the employer, and members would have to be involved and engaged in an 
unprecedented way to defend themselves.  Thus, to facilitate preparations the 
Society hired organizers from the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) 
and Hotel Employees-Restaurant Employees (HERE) in 2003. Organizers like 
Michelle Duncan would go to the different workplaces and talk directly to 
members on their breaks. Substantial email communication took place as well, 
both between members and union representatives, and through a listserv. New 
staff learned very quickly that the members of the Society were very partial to 
email, even for discussions with co-workers in the same facility, and this mode of 
communication became pivotal in the strike, both as a rapid mode of information 
sharing and dispersal within the union, and because of an email sent by the 
employer.   
 In the fall of 2004 a contract committee was established to begin to 
involve members, and about ninety of the approximately 1000 members 
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participated. The members would break into groups with those they knew to 
discuss contract issues. These members then took the information back to their 
workplaces and returned with feedback from their co-workers on the ground. 
Spouses were invited to the meetings as it was understood that workers are not 
often autonomous beings, but are interwoven with partners and families, 
emotionally and financially. Rattai and others laudably recognized that if 
negotiations were unsuccessful and a strike considered, broad support from 
members, but also their families, would be necessary.  
 The union developed its first strike policies, procedures and manual, 
drawing from other unions, but, with the involvement of members, tailoring 
examples collected to the specificities of their “professional” local.  This 
collaborative process was seen as key for involving members, promoting union 
ideas without implanting a rigid template, and recognizing that members saw 
their work as distinct. Member-driven, voluntary sub-committees were 
developed once people became involved in the contract committee because the 
number of involved members began to grow. Members saw their intellectual 
labour being valued in a union context and wanted to contribute.  Throughout 
the process, the members insisted on conscientious, meticulous, thorough 
research, believing that quantitative data and facts would be indisputable in 
discussions with management, and powerful in public awareness campaigns.  
The union also ensured that its financial preparations were sound, prepared 
drafts of potential messaging and solidified its media lists and communication 
tools. 
 The Society began negotiations with Hydro One in January of 2005 as the 
contract was due to expire on March 31. When the PWU settled with Hydro One 
in advance of their contract expiration (also March 31) without concessions, 
members of the Society concluded that they would be targeted for cutbacks and 
would be unfairly singled out by management. The union thus began a 
campaign based on the idea of “respect” for energy professionals.  
 When the communications blackout was lifted in February at the request 
of the union, the key employer demands were widely circulated and the pivotal 
issue of the strike was exposed. Management was proposing to extend base 
hours from 35 to 40 hours a week without additional compensation, reduce 
benefits and seek additional freedom to contract out work. However, a proposal 
for a two-tier wage structure with new hires being paid a lower salary than those 
already working was the issue that most offended the Society’s membership. 
Members felt this was disrespectful to new hires, particularly young engineers 
being hired right out of university, an insult to them as professionals, and an 
insult to engineering as a profession. This fueled both their anger and their sense 
of solidarity.  These were workers who prided themselves on being dedicated, 
dutiful professionals, and they saw this as an unprovoked attack from 
management.  
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Consequently, the campaign emphasis about respect was changed to 
“fairness” to capture the basic ethical feelings of the members.  Materials were 
produced by the union, but organizers also saw members with their own home-
made and laminated materials, including buttons and lanyards with photos of 
the CEO, Tom Parkinson, and personal messages related to the negotiations. It 
was public knowledge that Parkinson had a salary increase of 35% the previous 
year, and members saw this as particularly potent when the Society was being 
asked to accept lower salaries for new hires.    
 The union communicated to members through email, newsletters, web 
sites, meetings and work-place discussions.  Members wrote to the union 
themselves in unprecedented numbers.  Discontent spread quickly, and the 
emphasis on fairness for energy professionals effectively captured the workers’ 
sentiments and served as an engine for further member engagement. When a 
strike vote was held during the last week of March, 98% of the membership 
across the province walked-in their ballots for the first time in the history of the 
Society, and gave the union an astounding 97%strike mandate.  
 Following the March 31 deadline, negotiations continued. Hydro One 
began threatening the union with a lockout in April and Parkinson himself sent a 
long email to every member of the Society outlining his concerns and feelings.  
The members found his email insulting and offensive, and replied to him 
directly, to other members and to the union. The union received 300 emails in 
response to Parkinson’s message, the vast majority of which expressed anger and 
disgust at his words and tone and emphasized their support for the Society.  
 A final offer vote, which had been forced by the employer in advance of 
the April 27 strike deadline, was held across the province with the media in 
attendance, including at the Church of the Holy Trinity in Toronto located next 
to the Hydro One headquarters on Bay Street. In collaboration with organizers, 
young female workers had organized a caucus for the younger members, many 
of whom had signed contracts with Hydro One months before and were to start 
mid-summer, but who were not yet actually working.  Some members, but 
particularly these young workers, wore “No” T-shirts to the vote, and 95% of the 
membership did reject the employer’s final offer. 
 Seeking to educate the public and reaffirm the union’s pride in its 
members’ contributions, Müller and Rattai emphasized the importance of Society 
members’ labour within the hydro system during media interviews. Ontario had 
seen a crippling cross-province power outage in the summer of 2003, and 
memories of this were fresh. Hydro One management and Dwight Duncan, then 
Liberal Minister of Energy, were quoted speaking about contingency plans, with 
Duncan claiming that a few hundred managers could “fill the void” in the event 
of a strike or lock-out (Brennan 2005).  
 The union organized small actions once the final-offer vote had been 
rejected, starting with afternoon educational pickets at the Hydro One 
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headquarters and other sites around the province to give workers who had never 
engaged in job action before some experience, without establishing full picket 
lines immediately. Members were also asked to take half a day to meet with their 
local MPP, a strategy designed to foster political engagement among members 
slowly and comfortably, but also to move the focus to the Liberal government, 
who were ultimately responsible for the oversight of Hydro One.  Meetings were 
also set up with city councilors and Toronto Mayor David Miller, and the union 
took three prominent scientists to Duncan’s office to share their blackout risk 
analysis with the Minister. 
 Throughout this time, negotiations did not occur, despite union requests 
and the Minister encouraging both sides to get back to the table. But dialogue 
was continuing and growing within the Society, particularly through small 
group meetings with workers and union organizers, and discussions on the 
listserv. Individual members continuously contacted the union leadership with 
their views in a way not expected by organizers and representatives. On June 1, 
the first picket line was organized in Barrie, a key hydro control centre for the 
Ontario grid and workplace for 200 Society members. Those seeking to enter 
were delayed by half an hour. Seeing the line and delays, management began 
using buses and helicopters to move operators into the facility, an act that 
triggered additional picket lines across the province.  Pickets continued to 
expand at hydro workplaces across Ontario until they were erected at 100 job 
sites. In early July, a court injunction halted picketing at all generation stations, 
even though these pickets had already been limited by an earlier injunction.  
Petitions were developed and disseminated, and extensive dialogue 
among members continued, particularly around strategy and whether to begin to 
target the Liberal government further. Organiser Michelle Duncan and local vice-
president Rattai explained that the desire to escalate and diversify actions was 
member-driven, and came from workers of all ages. Workers would send 
motivating emails to the listserv, encouraging their co-workers, and sharing their 
reflections on the strike as not being about themselves personally, but about the 
youth, and the future. Workers began self-organizing into political action teams 
that would circulate the Premier’s and Energy Minister’s itineraries, and then 
follow the politicians in order to picket summer events of all kinds, wherever 
they were. About 200 Society members interrupted the Premier’s speech at the 
Association of Municipalities of Ontario. A 100-member protest and smaller sit-
in at the Toronto Board of Trade led to the removal of Müller from the property. 
The Society also tried using international political pressure, contacting US 
Senators about the domino-effect risk to the hydro system if an outage were to 
occur in Ontario because Society members were not at work. Society members 
even began to share their newfound picketing expertise with locked out workers 
at the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Organizers report that members were 
surprised to find some of the journalists and other media workers seated, and 
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that the engineers had encouraged marching at the CBC picket whenever they 
visited.     
As the summer progressed, the Society’s members remained engaged, 
but there were few signs of progress in settling the strike. Many of the newly 
hired scheduled to start on August 1st were fired, as were long-serving 
employees who took a leadership role in the cross-province pickets. The Society 
led the Toronto Labour Day Parade in early September, and workers who had 
been fired, proposed and then wore T-shirts that read, “fired.” Young engineers 
of both genders and from various ethnic backgrounds were prominent in the 
contingent, even though they had been terminated and many of them did not 
know if they would be re-hired. In fact, the whole group was very visible as 800 
members were present, most of whom had driven in from all corners of the 
province to participate.  
After a full summer of political action, and little sign that negotiations 
would be resuming despite the appointment of a mediator in late July, the 
Society assessed research data and opted to make television commercials 
featuring the young workers who had been fired and targeting the Liberal 
government and its power to end the strike.  In a media launch held at Queen’s 
Park, the commercials, which depicted the young, ethnically diverse and very 
articulate engineers, were shown for journalists, and the Society announced that 
these commercials were scheduled to appear on OMNI, a multicultural television 
channel. Very shortly thereafter, the Society was informed that Parkinson had 
finally agreed to arbitration, the approach recommended by the mediator. This 
indicated that the political action of the Society had finally caused the Liberal 
government to step in, instructing Parkinson to accept arbitration and end the 
strike. In the settlement, base hours were not changed, and while two-tier 
pensions were established, the two-tier wage proposal was defeated.  
A large membership meeting was held at the Royal York, a unionized 
Toronto hotel, and virtually all of the 1000 members from across the province 
attended. The members celebrated, and in a display that moved many to tears, 
the young workers gave flowers to the older members who had been fired 
during the strike. This display of solidarity was seen as a powerful culmination 
to a strike that had largely been driven by cross-generational solidarity and a 
sense of the need to protect shared work, and future workers.  
 
ASSESSING THE STRIKE  
  
Without question, the strike by the Society of Energy Professionals was a 
remarkable case of worker militancy, by any standard. The engagement of so 
many workers for so long, in very hot weather, in many physical sites, and in 
diverse ways is noteworthy, but even more so because this was a group of 
workers that had little experience with political or strike action, and no history of 
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union consciousness. The restructuring of the energy sector changed the work 
terrain for workers in the hydro system, breaking a unified public system into 
many components with different management regimes, thereby eroding the 
membership of the Society, and “marketizing” the rules of work within the 
system. This neoliberal climate materially changed the reality of work and 
management in Ontario’s hydro sector, and was bolstered by a broader cultural 
campaign stressing competition and individualism.  Management also targeted 
the Society in explicit and more subtle ways, changing members’ views of Hydro 
One as an organization, and their place within it as workers.  
These developments could have been merely tolerated by the Society 
members and leadership, or turned into individual problems about which to 
complain, but not collectively resist. However, the staff and leaders of the Society 
did not simply accept the inevitability of the devaluation of their members, but 
instead opted to resist through the collective bargaining process and political 
action.  The staff and leaders of the Society created the conditions within which 
worker anger could be shared, mobilized and organized, but also within which 
members could take leadership roles, become involved in different ways, and 
influence the strategy of the entire local. And the degree to which members took 
hold of the opportunity and steered it off in new directions surprised even the 
staff and leaders.  Clearly, the collaborative approach to political action taken 
within the Society was key to getting and gaining the involvement of hundreds 
of members who saw themselves as professionals with skills and intelligence, 
who then transferred their knowledge, time and energy into job action once they 
were asked to do so. They realized that they could contribute as unionists and 
co-workers in defense of their profession and were motivated by the pursuit of 
“fairness.”  
Since the strike, a number of things have changed for the Society and its 
members. In the months and years that followed, members felt that they were 
still being devalued but through smaller scale, daily strategies that have caused 
them to feel as though they have less control over their work.  Contract 
negotiations since 2005 have progressed without strikes, however. Parkinson 
resigned in late 2006 and the replacement CEO, Laura Formusa, uses a very 
different tone in dealing with the Society, according to Bell. The current collective 
agreement extends to 2013 and a Memorandum of Agreement signed in the 
spring of 2007 resolved many outstanding union concerns.   
  Members say they feel more solidarity with the broader labour 
movement and other workers, and demonstrate this in a range ways including 
providing picket support for UNITE-HERE, the Toronto Police Association, and 
other unions; sending monetary donations to striking locals; and participating in 
many labour conventions and events.  Some members saw the parallel between 
their struggle against two-tier wages in 2005 and the recent management 
proposals for two-tier wages that were accepted by the United Auto Workers in 
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the United States, and recognize this as a recurring management strategy for 
workers of all kinds. Although contingents are smaller, the Society continues to 
participate in Labour Day with a post-strike high of many hundreds in 2007.  
Not surprisingly, a smaller number of dedicated activists form the core of 
current political action strategies, but many members agree that the strike 
solidified their role as a “trade union” or even a “blue-collar union,” whether 
they are pleased with this result or not.  Whether the politicization seen in the 
2005 strike will translate into ongoing and increased political engagement by 
Society members, effective resistance to management demands, and an enduring 
union-consciousness is yet to be seen, but without question the strike was a 
powerful display of collective action by “professionals” and one that can inform 
broader strategies and projects for union renewal. 
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